Glendale Heights DUI Lawyer Brief On Glendale Heights Arrest And Suspension

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

PAGE

STANDARD OF REVIEW

THE DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIES HERE ………………………………5

People v. Sorenson , 196 Ill.2d 425, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001)…………………………………….5

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE STATE’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED FINDING AT THE DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY SUSPENSION HEARING WHEN THE DEFENDANT AS THE ONLY WITNESS, PRESENTED UNCONTROVERTED, UNIMPEACHED, AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT A TRAFFIC VIOLATION AND THAT HE WAS NOT DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.

A. The Defendant made a prima facie case that the stopping of his car was unjustified because he only moved out of his lane to avoid striking the emergency vehicles blocking his lane of travel.

People v. Collins , 154 Ill.App.3d 149,

506 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1987) ……………………………………………….9

People v. Decker , 181 Ill.App.3d 427,

537 N.E.2d 386 (Ill. App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1989) …………………………………………….9

People v. Rush , 319 Ill.App.3d 34,

745 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. App. 2 ^nd Dist., 2001) …………………………………………….9

People v. Drewes , 278 Ill.App.3d 786,

663 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1996) ……………………………………………..10

People v. Safiran , 229 Ill.App.3d 639,

593 N.E.2d 1027 (Ill App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1992) …………………………………………..10

B. The Trial Court ignored all of the Defendant’s uncontroverted explanations regarding his testimony and essentially “cherry-picked” his testimony in order to find probable cause.

i. The mere denial of drinking does not equate probable cause.

People v. Bavas , 251 Ill.App.3d 720,

623 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. App. 2 ^nd Dist., 1993) ……………………….10

ii. The declination of field sobriety tests does not equate probable cause.

iii. The Defendant’s momentary crossing outside his lane of travel was explained.

People v. Collins , 154 Ill.App.3d 149,

506 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1987) ……………………….11

iv. The Court ignored all of the Defendant’s uncontroverted and credible testimony.

C. The facts of the instant case are almost identical to those of People v. Bavas .

People v. Bavas , 251 Ill.App.3d 720,

623 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. App. 2 ^nd Dist., 1993) ……………………………………15, 16

CONCLUSION

People v. Shields , 337 Ill.App.3d 1063,

787 N.E.2d 342, 529 (Ill. App. 1 ^st Dist., 2003) …………………………………………..13

People v. Orth , 124 Ill.2d 326,

530 N.E.2d 210, 214 (1988)……………………………………………………………….9

SUPREME COURT RULES

Supreme Court Rule 301, 155 Ill.2d R. 301………………………………………………………3

STATUTES

625 ILCS 5/11 – 907(c)(1)…….

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal by the Defendant from a final judgment denying his Petition to Rescind his Summary Suspension. (C. 46). The facts are undisputed. The Defendant was arrested on January 26, 2008 for DUI by Officer Cahill of the Village of Glendale Heights and the Defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension on February 27, 2008 (C. 16, see appendix 1). The Defendant’s summary suspension hearing was held on July 2, 2008. (C. 1 & C. 103). At the hearing, the Defendant testified that he was pulled over by a Glendale Heights Police Officer on his way home from Luigi’s in Fox Valley. (C. 106). The Defendant further testified that he did not break any laws prior to the stop and was not intoxicated while driving home. (C. 107 & C. 122). Officer Cahill did not testify at the hearing.

At the conclusion of the Defendant’s case, the Court granted the State’s motion for a directed finding, finding that the Defendant had not made a prima facie case for a rescission. (C. 127) The Defendant argued that the burden should be shifted to the State to justify the suspension because there was no evidence that the Defendant committed any traffic violations and was not under the influence of alcohol. (C. 122 – 123). The Court ultimately denied the Defendant’s Petition to Rescind the Summary Suspension on July 2, 2008. (C. 46). The Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Summary Suspension Petition on July 14, 2008 and the Defendant’s motion was heard and denied on August 28, 2008. (C. 48 – 49). The Defendant filed his timely Notice of Appeal on August 28, 2008. (C. 147)

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED FINDING AT A SUMMARY SUSPENSION HEARING WHEN THE DEFENDANT PRESENTED UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY THAT HE WAS NOT VIOLATING ANY LAWS PRIOR TO BEING STOPPED AND THAT HE WAS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This appeal is taken as a matter of right under Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303(a)(1), which govern appeals from final judgments in civil proceedings. Supreme Court Rule 301 provides that every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right. 155 Ill.2d R. 301. Rule 303(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the notice of appeal from final judgments in civil cases “must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from.” 155 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1).

The judgment denying the Defendant’s Petition to Rescind was entered on July 2, 2008 (C. 46, see appendix 2) The Notice of Appeal was timely filed with the clerk of the circuit court on August 28, 2008. (C. 82, see appendix p. 3)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the facts are not in dispute, the issue involved is wholly a question of law. People v. Sorenson , 196 Ill.2d 425, 431, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (2001). When reviewing the ultimate question as to whether there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause, reviewing courts should do so under the de novo standard. Id. Thus, this appeal should be reviewed under the de novo standard.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 26, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant Angel Reyes was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Improper Lane Usage, Improper Turn, Operating an Uninsured Motor Vehicle, and Driving While License Suspended (C. 1 – 5). The Defendant’s summary suspension hearing was held on July 2, 2008. (C. 103). At the hearing, the Defendant was called to testify. (C. 104). On direct examination, the Defendant testified that he ate dinner at Luigi’s in Fox Valley and left approximately two hours later. (C. 105). While dining at Luigi’s, he drank two screwdrivers and ate two meals. (C. 106). After dinner, the Defendant began driving home, taking Route 59 to I-88, I-88 to I-355, and I-355 to Route 64. (C. 106). While driving northbound Bloomingdale Road, the Defendant saw an ambulance and a fire truck parked with their vehicles intruding into the Defendant’s lane of travel. (C. 107). The Defendant switched lanes of traffic to avoid hitting the emergency vehicles, then returned to his lane of travel. (C. 107). Shortly after the Defendant passed the emergency vehicles, he saw a police officer’s squad car behind him with its emergency lights on and the Defendant immediately pulled into a nearby parking lot. (C. 108).

After both vehicles stopped and before the Defendant was asked for identification, the police officer told the Defendant “hey, I know you. You are Angel Reyes.” (C. 108). The Defendant asked “how do you know that?” and the officer replied that he knew him from a previous roadblock a couple of months ago. (C. 108 – 109). The officer asked the Defendant if he had been drinking and the Defendant said “no,” but the Defendant’s fiancé answered that they had “two screwdrivers.” (C. 109). The Defendant then gave the officer his State ID and the officer asked him to take field sobriety tests. (C. 109). After the Defendant declined to take the tests, the officer arrested the Defendant. (C. 111). The Defendant further testified that he was not under the influence while driving his car, the two drinks did not affect his ability to drive, and he was not feeling intoxicated. (C.112 – 113).

On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that he responded “no” to the officer’s question “have you been drinking,” (C. 113). But he also testified that he was not drunk. (C. 113). The Assistant State’s Attorney further asked him if it was true that he had “a beer and two screwdrivers,” but the Defendant stated that it was not true, re-affirming his previous testimony that he only had two screwdrivers. (C. 113). When the Defendant was asked about the size of the drinks, he testified that they were small and drank them with his meal, elaborating that he ate part of his fiancé’s meal as well. (C. 114). The Defendant also answered truthfully that he was arrested on that night on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. (C. 115).

The State then asked additional questions about the emergency vehicles on Bloomingdale Road. (C. 115). Although the Defendant could not recall exactly how far they were down the road when he first saw them, he did testify that they were on the right side of the road, the vehicles had their emergency lights on, that Bloomingdale Road has two lanes going northbound, and he did see the emergency vehicles sometime after he turned off of Route 64 onto to Bloomingdale. (C. 115 – 116). When the Defendant approached the emergency vehicles, he again testified that he swerved to avoid the vehicles and swerved back into his lane after passing them. (C. 116). Shortly after passing the vehicles, the Defendant noticed a police car following him, but thought it was a police car coming from emergency vehicles he just passed (C. 116 – 117). The Defendant further testified that even though he was not familiar with the area, he does remember the squad car activating its emergency lights as he turned on to Daniels Street. (C. 118). While testifying on cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that he could not say with certainty that he did not travel with a portion of his tires on the lane markers or lane dividers on Bloomingdale Road. (C. 118).

After the Defendant saw that the police car’s emergency lights were on, he pulled into a nearby parking lot. (C. 119). While conversing with the police officer, the Defendant said he was tired and explained on cross-examination that he was tired from eating two meals that night. (C. 119). The Defendant also agreed with the State that his reaction time is slower when he is tired. (C. 119). While talking with the police officer, the Defendant did not remember whether the police officer told him that his breath smelled like alcohol. (C. 119). The Defendant explained that he refused to take the field sobriety tests because he was not intoxicated and was always told to refuse; even if you are sober. (C. 119).

After the Defendant testified, the Defense rested. The arresting officer, Officer Cahill, did not testify at the summary suspension hearing. The State subsequently made a motion for a directed finding. (C. 121). They argued that the Defendant had not met its burden because the Defendant denied drinking to the police officer, refused the field sobriety tests, swerved while driving, and could not say as a matter of certainty that he did not place any portion of his car on the dividing lines on Bloomingdale Road. (C. 121). In response, the Defense stated that the Defendant only swerved to avoid colliding with the emergency vehicles, there was no evidence that his decision was influenced by alcohol, and that his driving was consistent with that of a sober driver. (C. 122). Furthermore, the Defendant had only two drinks with two meals and they were consumed in a two hour time-frame. (C. 122). The Defense also argued that a substantial question of bias was raised because the officer remembered the Defendant from a previous incident and the personal way he interacted with the Defendant (C. 123). Lastly, since the evidence needs to be taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to survive a motion for a directed finding, the Defendant had met its burden by demonstrating that the Defendant had not committed any traffic violations and was not under the influence of alcohol. (C. 122 – 123).

The trial court granted the State’s motion for a directed finding and confirmed the Defendant’s summary suspension. (C. 126 & C. 46). The court stated that the officer had reasonable grounds to stop the vehicle because the Defendant swerved out of his lane and swerved back into his lane without using a turn signal. (C. 125). In addition, the court found that the Defendant did not know whether or not he drove on the highway dividing lines as a further basis for the stop. (C. 125). Furthermore, the court ruled that the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant because the Defendant’s fiancé told the officer that the Defendant consumed alcohol, the Defendant denied drinking, he refused the field sobriety tests, admitted he was tired, and there was already an outstanding warrant for his arrest. (C. 126 – 127). Given, the totality of the circumstances, the court ultimately ruled that the Defendant had not made a prima facie case for a rescission based on the aforementioned facts and granted the State’s motion for a directed finding. (C. 127).

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE STATE’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED FINDING AT THE DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY SUSPENSION HEARING WHEN THE DEFENDANT AS THE ONLY WITNESS, PRESENTED UNCONTROVERTED, UNIMPEACHED, AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT A TRAFFIC VIOLATION AND THAT HE WAS NOT DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.

A. The Defendant made a prima facie case that the stopping of his car was unjustified because he only moved out of his lane to avoid striking the emergency vehicles blocking his lane of travel.

In this case, the Court erred when it granted the State’s motion for a directed finding, ruling that as a matter of law, the Defendant failed to make a prima facie case for a rescission. (C. 127). The Defendant testified clearly and concisely that he was not under the influence, and that he only moved out of his lane to avoid the emergency vehicles blocking his lane. (C. 107 & C. 112). If a motorist moves out of his lane to avoid striking another vehicle, this action is not a valid basis to stop the vehicle. see People v. Collins , 154 Ill.App.3d 149, 151, 506 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ill. App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1987) (holding that when the defendant crossed over the lane line to avoid hitting a parked car, there was no violation and thus no valid basis to stop the vehicle); People v. Decker , 181 Ill.App.3d 427, 430, 537 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ill. App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1989) (a “nonhazardous, monetary crossing of the center line,” standing alone, does not support a valid stop); People v. Rush , 319 Ill.App.3d 34, 40, 745 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. App. 2 ^nd Dist., 2001) (a stop is invalid if the officer knows additional facts that make it reasonably apparent that crossing the center line is legal). In fact, under section 625 ILCS 5/11 – 907(c)(1) (also known as “Scott’s Law”), the Defendant is required to switch lanes “into a lane not adjacent to that of the authorized emergency vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/11 – 907(c)(1). Therefore, since the defendant testified that he only crossed the center lane line to avoid the emergency vehicles in his lane, he effectively presented a prima facie case that he did nothing that would justify the police stopping his vehicle. Therefore, the burden must shift to the State to present evidence as to why the “stop” was justified. People v. Drewes , 278 Ill.App.3d 786, 787, 663 N.E.2d 456, 457 (Ill. App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1996) . If there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the motorist’s vehicle, the Defendant is then entitled to a rescission of his summary suspension. People v. Safiran , 229 Ill.App.3d 639, 640, 593 N.E.2d 1027 (Ill App. 3 ^rd Dist., 1992) .

B. The Trial Court ignored all of the Defendant’s uncontroverted explanations regarding his testimony and essentially ‘cherry-picked’ his testimony in order to find probable cause.

The court found that the Defendant did not present a prima facie case to rescind the summary suspension because the Defendant denied drinking to the police officer, refused the field sobriety tests, swerved out of his lane, and admitted to drinking two drinks at dinner.

i. The mere denial of drinking does not equate probable cause.

Simply because the Defendant stated that he was not drinking does not mean that the opposite is true. This rationale makes a mockery of the protections of the 4 ^th Amendment of the Constitution. The mere fact that the Defendant denied drinking does not mean that he was intoxicated, especially when the Defendant offered uncontroverted and sworn testimony that he was not intoxicated and not under the influence of alcohol. (C. 112). The trial court cannot disregard his testimony if it is neither contradicted nor impeached because it simply chooses to do so. People v. Bavas , 251 Ill.App.3d 720, 724, 623 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. App. 2 ^nd Dist., 1993) . Furthermore, the Defendant explained that he denied drinking because he was not drunk. (C. 113).

ii. The declination of field sobriety tests does not equal probable cause.

The refusal to cooperate in the investigation of a crime does not logically dictate that the person was engaged in a crime. If this logic prevailed, then any time a person refused to participate in an investigation, it would automatically grant the police probable cause to arrest the person for a crime. For example, if the police were searching for a stolen library card, and a person at the library refused to answer his questions, would that give the officer probable cause to arrest that person for theft? Absolutely not. The situation is not dissimilar in the instant case. The Defendant explained in his testimony that he declined to take the field sobriety tests because he was not intoxicated. (C. 120). A refusal to take field sobriety tests does not indicate that one was intoxicated anymore than refusing to be questioned because one is innocent. The Defendant’s testimony on this issue was not contradicted by any other evidence. However, the trial court inexplicably ignored the veracity of the testimony and improperly held it against the Defendant.

iii. The Defendant’s single momentary crossing outside his lane of travel was explained and subsequently ignored.

As stated above, it is not a traffic violation if the motorist leaves his lane of travel to avoid striking another vehicle. Collins, 154 Ill.App.3d at 151. The Defendant testified, without contradiction, that he left his lane of travel to avoid colliding with emergency vehicles in his lane of traffic. Instead of accepting the Defendant’s testimony on its face and taking it in the light most favorable to the Defendant, the Court invented its own conclusions, stating “by the defendant’s own testimony…he did violate the traffic code,” (C. 126). This is an incorrect statement of law. The Defendant did not testify that he solely left his lane of travel. Instead, he provided a reasonable and specific reason as to why he was forced to leave his lane. (C. 107). Furthermore, the court seem to imply that his “swerving” indicated erratic driving, but there was no evidence to support this conclusion. It is possible that the Defendant merely used the word “swerved” to describe the fact that he moved partially out of his lane to avoid a collision. There was no evidence to contradict that the Defendant did not have a valid basis to leave his lane and no evidence to suggest that his decision to momentarily leave his lane was influenced by alcohol. However, the court ignored the law, ignored the Defendant’s explanation, and used his testimony against him as a factor in finding probable cause.

iv. The Court ignored all of the Defendant’s uncontroverted testimony.

At the summary suspension hearing, the Defendant took an oath with the penalty of perjury and testified to the events that occurred on the night in question. (C. 104 – 117). The Defendant was the only witness who testified that the hearing. (C. 104 – C. 127). Although the Defendant provided reasonable explanations for all his conduct, the court chose to ignore his explanations. The court was not in a position where it had to weigh the strength of conflicting testimonies and come to a final conclusion as to which one was more credible; it was only faced with one testimony.

The court found that the Defendant moved out of his lane of travel, but ignored any explanation as to why he did so. It found that the Defendant’s refusal of field sobriety tests factored into the finding of probable cause, but ignored the fact that he is not legally required to assist in the officer’s investigation. The court found that the Defendant admitted to consuming two drinks, but completely ignored the fact that he drank them with his dinner, in the span of two hours, and testified that he was not intoxicated from those two drinks. It found that the Defendant was tired, but ignored that he attended a wake during the day and ate a late dinner. But most importantly, the court ignored the fact that the Defendant’s testimony was not contradicted, not impeached, and not was not inherently improbable. Drawing one’s own conclusions is not taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner to survive a motion for directed finding. If the court were to hold all defendants to this standard, then no person could ever survive a motion for a directed finding. A defendant could not testify that he had two drinks, was not drunk, and still survive a motion for a directed finding. Under People v. Bavas , the court cannot disregard the Defendant’s testimony under these circumstances. Bavas , 251 Ill.App.3d at 724. Therefore, since the Defendant made a prima facie case for a rescission, the court should have denied the State’s motion for a directed finding and shifted the burden to the State to provide evidence that justified the suspension. People v. Marsala , 376 Ill.App.3d 1046, 1048, 877 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ill. App. 2 ^nd Dist., 2007)

C. The facts of the instant case are almost identical to those in People v. Bavas .

There is precedent directly on point on this matter. The facts of the instant case are closely analogous with People v. Bavas . 251 Ill.App.3d 720. In Bavas , the Defendant testified that he consumed two beers at a restaurant while celebrating his wife’s birthday, which was from 8:30 PM to 12:30AM. Id. at 721. The Defendant testified that he was pulled over on his way home despite the fact that he had not committed any traffic violations. Id. While talking with the police officer, the Defendant admitted to drinking two beers, refused to perform field sobriety tests, and was subsequently arrested. Id. At the summary suspension hearing, the Defendant also testified that he was not under the influence of alcohol. Id. The arresting officer in Bavas did not testify at the summary suspension hearing. Id.

In Bavas , the court held that under these facts, the defendant made a prima facie case for a rescission based on his testimony that “he had only two beers, was not intoxicated…[and] was not violating any traffic laws when he was stopped,” Id. at 724. In support of the ruling, the court stated, “Where the testimony of a witness is neither contradicted, either by positive testimony or by circumstances, nor inherently improbable, and the witness has not been impeached, the testimony cannot be disregarded by even a jury,” Id. Therefore, since the defendant’s testimony was unrebutted and not inherently improbable, the defendant made a prima facie case for a rescission. Id.

The facts and rules of Bavas are applicable to the case at bar. Since the Defendant was the only witness who testified, any possible contradictions and impeachment needed to have come from the Defendant’s own testimony on direct or cross-examination. On direct examination, the Defendant testified that while he drove home from Luigi’s, he avoided striking emergency vehicles in his lane of travel and then returned to his lane. (C. 107 – 108).

In addition, the Defendant testified clearly, concisely, and demonstrated an accurate recall of the events that took place. He testified the exact route he took (Route 59 to I-88, I-88 to I-355, and I-355 to Route 64), the description of Bloomingdale Road (two lanes northbound), the time frame in which he saw the emergency vehicles, and how he responded to their presence in his lane of travel. (C. 106 & C. 116). The Defendant stated that he drank two screwdrivers during his meal and was not intoxicated. (C. 106 & 112 – 113). When the Defendant was asked on cross-examination whether he also had a beer with his screwdrivers, he said no. (C. 113). When he asked about the size of the meals, he answered the State’s questions appropriately, stating that he had two entrée’s and half of his fiancé’s meal. (C. 120). None of the Defendant’s testimony on direct examination was contradicted through the State’s cross-examination. Furthermore, the Defendant was not impeached by previous inconsistent statements, witnesses, or by any other means throughout the hearing.

In fact, the Defendant truthfully and credibly testified in such a manner that would negate any claim that his testimony was only self-serving. For example, when the Defendant was asked on cross-examination, “Can you say with a certainty that you at no point traveled with a portion of your tires on the lane markers or lane dividers on Bloomingdale Road?” the Defendant answered, “No, I can’t say that.” (C. 118). If the Defendant was only testifying to self-serving facts, he would have testified, “Yes, my tires did not touch the lane makers or dividers at all.” However, the Defendant testified credibly that he cannot say with certainty that for the entire time he drove on Bloomingdale, a portion of his tires did not touch the lane markers and dividers at any time. (C. 118). The simple “touching” of a lane marker by a vehicle’s tire does not indicate that a violation occurred. Furthermore, the Defendant did not affirmatively say that his tires touched the lanes, only that he could not remember, with certainty, whether they had or had not. (C. 118). In addition, the Defendant also testified that when the officer asked if he had been drinking, he initially said “no” and his fiancé told the officer that he had two screwdrivers. (C. 109). Again, the Defendant did not embellish, nor alter, his answer in order to present himself in the best light; he testified truthfully. Therefore, since the Defendant’s testimony was not contradicted, was not inherently probable, and was not impeached, according to Bavas , his testimony cannot be disregarded. Bavas , 251 Ill.App.3d at 724.

Accordingly, due to the factual and legal similarities between Bavas and the instant case, Bavas should control. Both cases involved defendants testifying that they had two drinks and had those drinks at a restaurant over a time-frame of a couple of hours. The defendants both testified credibly, without positive or inherent contradictions, that they did not commit any traffic violations. When both defendants were pulled over by the police, the police officer learned they had two drinks and they both refused the field sobriety tests. Furthermore, both defendants’ testimonies were credible, were absent of inherent contradictions, and were not impeached. Most importantly, the arresting officer did not testify at either hearing. Therefore, they did not, and could not, provide positive testimony to contradict the defendants’ testimony. Given the analogous set of facts in Bavas and the instant case, this court should hold that Bavas controls and find that the Defendant made a prima facie case for a rescission. Thus, this court should reverse the granting of the State’s motion for a directed finding.

CONCLUSION

Under normal circumstances, the Defendant would pray that this Honorable Court reverse the granting of the State’s motion for a directed finding and remand the case for further proceedings. However, since the Defendant’s suspension has already run (see appendix 4), the Defendant instead asks for the equitable relief of a rescission. See People v. Shields , 337 Ill.App.3d 1063, 1066, 787 N.E.2d 342, 529 (Ill. App. 1 ^st Dist., 2003) (after the court reversed the defendant’s conviction, the court did not remand the case because the defendant already served his sentence); People v. Cassidy, 250 Ill. 426, 95 N.E.2d 498 (1911)(after the court reversed defendant’s conviction, the case was not remanded for resentencing since the defendant was sentenced under the wrong statute and had already served two years in the penitentiary)

INDEX TO THE RECORD

C0000001 01-28-08 Complaint

C0000007 01-28-08 Bail Bond

C0000008 01-28-08 Warning to Motorist

C0000009 01-28-08 Law Enforcement Sworn Report

C0000011 02-11-08 Confirmation of Statutory Summary Suspension

C0000012 02-27-08 Notice of Filing

C0000013 02-27-08 Appearance

C0000014 02-27-08 Motion for Misdemeanor Discovery

C0000016 02-27-08 Petition to Rescind Statutory Summary Suspension

C0000018 03-19-08 Court Status Report

C0000019 04-30-08 Warrant

C0000020 04-30-08 Bond Forfeiture Order

C0000021 05-05-08 Notice of Forfeiture

C0000022 05-16-08 Bail Bond

C0000023 05-16-08 Inmate Court Dispo

C0000024 05-16-08 Mittimus

C0000025 05-16-08 Warrant

C0000026 06-12-08 Notice of Filing

C0000028 06-12-08 Motion for Discovery

C0000031 06-12-08 Motion to Produce Confessions

C0000032 06-12-08 Notice to Produce at Summary Suspension Hearing

C0000034 06-12-08 Petition to Rescind Statutory Summary Suspension

C0000035 06-12-08 Criminal/Traffic Appearance

C0000036 06-12-08 Subpoena

C0000038 06-20-08 Notice of Filing

C0000039 06-20-08 State’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s 2 ^nd Petition to Rescind

C0000041 06-25-08 Order

C0000042 06-25-08 Transfer and Re-Assignment Order

C0000043 06-25-08 Subpoena

C0000044 06-25-08 Subpoena

C0000045 06-25-08 Civil Motion for Substitution of Judge

C0000046 07-02-08 Order Summary Suspension

C0000047 07-03-08 Continue Summary Suspension

C0000048 07-14-08 Notice of Filing

C0000049 07-14-08 Motion to Reconsider Denial of Summary Suspension Petition

C0000051 07-29-08 Notice

C0000052 07-29-08 Information

C0000053 07-29-08 Notice

C0000054 07-29-08 Response to Petitioner’s Motion to Reconsider Summary

Suspension Petition

C0000081 08-28-08 Notice of Filing

C0000082 08-28-08 Notice of Appeal

C0000083 08-28-08 Write of Praecipe

C0000084 08-28-08 Notice of Filing

C0000085 08-28-08 Motion to Quash Warrant and Vacate Bond Forfeiture

C0000087 08-28-08 Order

C0000088 08-28-08 Transfer and Re-Assignment Order

C0000089 09-03-08 Warrant

C0000090 09-03-08 Bond Forfeiture Order

C0000091 09-12-08 Notice of Forfeiture

C0000092 09-12-08 Notice of Motion

C0000093 09-12-08 Motion to Quash Warrant and Vacate Bond Forfeiture

C0000094 09-17-08 Order

C0000095 09-17-08 Transfer and Re-Assignment Order

C0000096 09-22-08 Warrant

C0000097 09-30-08 Appellate Court Order

C0000098 10-09-08 Warrant

C0000099 10-09-08 Bond Forfeiture Order

C0000100 Certified Copy of File Jacket

C0000101 Certified Copy of File Jacket

C0000103 09-04-08 Report of Proceedings From 07-02-08

C0000130 09-04-08 Report of Proceedings From 08-28-08

INDEX TO THE REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

PAGE

Witness: Defendant-Appellant Angel Reyes

C0000103 09-04-08 Report of Proceedings From 07-02-08

C0000104 09-04-08 1. Direct Examination……………………………………………..2

C0000113 04-04-08 2. Cross Examination…………………………………………….11

C0000130 09-04-08 Report of Proceedings From 08-28-08

(no witnesses testified)

APPENDIX

ITEM EXHIBIT

Petition to Rescind 1

Order Denying Summary Suspension Hearing (2-27-2008) 2

Notice of Appeal (8-28-2008) 3

Confirmation of Summary Suspension 4